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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

Case No.

17367

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD, AND ELLIS V. FLINT,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF,
BOX ELDER COUNTY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition seeking review of a final order of the
Compensation Appeals Board of the Utah State Industrial Commission.
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Section 35-4-10 UCA
(1953, as amended).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Applicant Ellis

v.

Flint, upon his initial application for

unemployment benefits, after leaving his employment with Box Elder
County, was denied unemployment benefits on the basis that he
voluntarily quit without good cause.

He appealed that decision

~~appeals referee; and the referee held that he had quit without good cause,

and denied benefits.

the Compensation Appeals Board,

Mr. Flint then appealed to

and the Board reversed the previous

and granted unemployment benefits,
leave 1-1ork with good cause.

finding that Mr. Flint

The plaintiff requested
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I
the Board to

'"'I

reconsider its decision, and this request '"'

Plaintiff then filed a petition seeking a writ of review; and tr
Clerk of the Supreme Court issued the writ, causing the entire
record to be filed with the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order reversing the decision of

~

Compensation Appeals Board and reinstating the decision of the
appeals referee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Claimant, Flint, commenced employment with Box Elder
County on April 1, 1979, (R., page 25), and voluntarily quit worr.
on March 14, 1980, (R., page 33; R.,
On April 29,

pages 46 and 47; R., page Ii

1980, he filed for unemployment benefits (R., page

53), and filled out a statement explaining why he had voluntar)
quit (R., pages 50, 51,
20, 1980,

52).

Flint was denied benefits on May

(R., page 48), and on June 2, 1980, filed a letter

wherein he requested a hearing by an Appeals Referee (R., pages
44,

45,

46,

47).

A question as to the timeliness of the appeal was

··I

raised by the Appeals Referee and resolved in favor of the
claimant (R., pages 29, 30,
pute that decision.

31,

32); and plaintiff does not d1°·

The hearing before the Appeals Referee wasl

held on July 25, 1980, following notification of the claimant

I

and the plaintiff; and Mr. Flint appeared representing himself·
The plaintiff was represented by Don Chase, Chairman of the
Elder County Commission (R., page 32).

BOX

Al though the plaintiff. I
i
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through its auditor, originally contended that the notification
of the July 25th hearing went to the wrong person,

(R., pages

10, 11), the plaintiff does not take that position on this appeal.
At the hearing, claimant stated that he had voluntarily
quit (R., page 5)
ing (R., page 36).

because of chest pains he suffered while workHis stated reason for the chest pains was

what he called harrassment by the Box Elder County Audi tor, Doris
Olsen,

(R., page 37).

Flint stated that he was the only depart-

ment head working for Box Elder County who was required to keep
track of his time by the Box Elder County Auditor {R., page 35).
He objected to keeping time cards on the basis that other department heads were not required to do so {R., page

3s),

and he re-

fused to keep them (R., page 36).
Flint suffered a coronary in the Fall of 1978 for which
he was hospitalized {R., page 37) and upon being released, was
told to avoid strenuous work (R., page 37).

At the time he

suffered his coronary, Flint was the Democratic candidate for
the position of Box Elder County Audi tor, an election which he
lost in November of 1978 to the current Box Elder County Auditor,
Doris Olsen {R., page 34).
Don Chase, the County's representative at the hearing,
testified that the County Auditor was requiring Mr. Flint to
file more detailed reports of his time than were required of
other department heads {R., page 40), and that Flint had mentioned that he was experiencing chest pains (R., page 41) •
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Chase also testified thai: he told Flint not to let it

i

bother him (R., page 41), and also told him that the County Audi'iI
had no authority to fire him or take any punitive action against

1

him for failure to file the time cards

I

(R., page 41).

Chase

I

I
(R • , pag:II

stated that he told Flint not to be bothered by the Auditor's
activities,

because only the Commission could fire him

I

41).

Flint was the only department head who traveled betweel/
other county departments and county agencies performing maintena:
work as needed,

(R.,

page 5); and the County Auditor desired

mart

detailed reports from him because his time had to be charged to
various departments

(R., page 40).

required to file time cards

Other department heads are

(R., page 40).

Although Flint was seeing a physician regularly, he di'
not report his chest pains to the doctor, and was not advised byl
a physician to quit work (R., pages 33 and 34).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW THAT
THE CLAIMANT QUIT WITH GOOD CAUSE.
The original decision of the Board of Review in this
case is found at page 14 of the Record;

and the pertinent state-

ment made therein is contained in one sentence, as follows:

"Because of the treatment being accorded to him
by the employer, the claimant began experiencing
angina.
11

The Appeals Referee found that the claimant voluntarily
left work without good cause,

stating as follows:

"Although the claimant may have been unduly
singled out to submit the report of his hours,
compliance with that request would not have
created a significant hardship on the claimant.
His resistance to the request complicated the
issue and undoubtedly caused increased hard
feelings, both for the claimant and the Auditor.
The claimant could, therefore, have reduced
the tensions on the job by complying with the
request of submitting the report.
It is concluded that it was the claimant's resistance
that caused his physical symptoms, rather than
his actual job duties; and he could have reduced
the threat to his health without quiting his job.
He did not have a definite assurance at work at
Hill Air Force Base at the time he quit."
(R., page 26)
The claimant filed a copy of

a

letter from his doctor,

dated August 5, 1980, which has become part of the record (page 19);

Which states as follows:

"I have been the physician for Ellis Flint for
the last seven years, and in November of 1978,
he had an acute myocardial infarction. Since
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that time, he has had intermittent chest pain
which has occasion.;lly been related to exercise
and also has been related to episodes of emotional stress."
"I ha·.:e been aware of pressures and stresses that
the patient has had with respect to his work for
some time and have monitored this over the past
year. Recently, these stresses have increased
and have been associated with an exacerbation
of angina.
It is my feeling that this is an extension of his underlying medical problem of
documented coronary disease in the past. Had r
been consulted with respect to this condition,
it would have been my advice that Mr. Flint remove
himself from the stressful situation which was
precipitating his coronary disease. As I would
have anticipated, his pain has stopped since he
has been relieved of this."
As can be seen, the only medical evidence appearing
anywhere in the record is the letter from Dr. Blanch, which
obviously was submitted subsequent to the date of the }•earing
on July 25th.

That letter points out that the cause of Mr.

Flint's problems was emotional stress and pressures associated
with his work; but, significantly, the doctor does not single
out a factor which created the stress to begin with.
Plaintiff submits that the evidence adduced at the
hearing, as contained in the transcript, shows that the claimant
created his own stress by absolutely refusing to perform a simple
timekeeping chore.
Furthermore, the claimant was made fully aware that tt::
Box Elder County Auditor had no authority over him, as Don Chase
testified:
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"I felt that really in our chain of command,
so to speak, he was responsible to me; and
there was, in my opinion, no reason for some
of these things to be, you know, for him to
be taking so much concern about them ...
... Just let me explain what I'm saying here-the chain of command. Actually, these people
that he was having some problems with didn't
have the authority or anything to fire him or
anything of that nature.
It had to come from
the Commissioner. These are the things I was
trying to explain to him. Just don't let those
things bother you ... "
(R., page 41).
Also, the claimant was seeing a doctor regularly; but,
by his own testimony,
was

did not once report to the doctor that he

having any chest pains or that he was bothered by his problems

at work until well after he quit.

In response to the Referee's

question at the hearing as to whether or not Mr. Flint had been
advised by his physician to quit his job, Mr. Flint replied;
"No, I didn't discuss this with my doctor; and
I didn't really get into this the day that I
came in here to quit."
(R. page 34).
Although the defendant may very well have suffered chest
pains in connection with his employment, and although he claims
the pains led him to be concerned enough for his heal th to quit
his work, on the other hand the chest pains were not serious
enough for him to even mention them to a doctor, whom he was
seeing on a regular basis.
The chest pains, according to the letter submitted by
the claimant's physician, were caused by stress.

The evidence

in the record shows that the stress was caused not by the County
Audi tor's attempt to have Mr. Flint file time cards, but rather
was caused in Mr. Flint's own mind because of the hard feelings
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created by his refusal to fill in any sort of time card.

Mr.

Flint's own stubborness caused the stress which, in turn,

cause~

whatever problem he experienced.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to reverse
the decision of the Board of Review and reinstate the decisioo
of the Appeal Referee on the basis that the evidence presented
shows only that Mr. Flint created his own problems through
childish actions in refusing to meet an entirely reasonable

h~
r~

quirement requested of him by the Box Elder County Auditor.

Dated

2tVjl
of December,

this~

1980.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Petition For Review to:

Mr. Floyd G. A~

and Mr. K. Allan Zabel, Special Assistants Attorney General, The
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security,
174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah
paid this

~of

84147, postageP~

December, 1980.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 17367

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD, and ELLIS V. FLINT,
Defendants and Respondents.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for the purpose of judicial review of a
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, reversing the decision of
the Appeal Referee, and allowing benefits to the claimant, Ellis V. Flint, on the grounds the
claimant had left work voluntarily, but with good cause.

DISPOSITION BELOW
Defendant-Claimant Ellis

v. Flint,

upon his initial application for unemployment benefits,

after leaving his employment with Box Elder County, was denied unemployment benefits by a
Department Representative pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979), on the ground that he voluntarily quit without good
cause. He appealed that decision to an Appeals Referee who affirmed the disqualification in a
de · ·
cision dated July 31, 1980. Mr. Flint then appealed to the Board of Review. The Board
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reversed the decision of the Appeal Referee by a decision issued September 5, 1980, in Ca,
No. 80-A-2109, 80-BR-245 and granted unemployment benefits. finding that Mr. Flint did leaii
work with good cause. The Plaintiff requested the Board to reconsider its decision. Therequ~'
was denied in a decision issued September 30, 1980.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of Review which allowed benefitsto\hi
claimants. Defendants seek affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants, Board of Review. Department of Employment Security, and the lnduslrial
Commission of Utah. substantially agree with the statement of facts set forth in Plaintiff's Briel.
except in the following particulars, to wit:
In 1978, the claimant, Ellis V. Flint, ran as the Democratic candidate for the officeo!Boi
Elder County Auditor. In October, 1978, claimant suffered a serious heart attack and wa!
hospitalized. Claimant lost the election to the current Box Elder County Auditor. Subsequenlli
claimant was hired as Maintenance Supervisor by the Republican Chairman of the Box Elder
County Commission, Mr. Don Chase. with the understanding that claimant would answeronl1
to Mr. Chase, would not have to answer to any other county official and would run I~'
maintenance department as he felt it should be run (R. pages 44, 45, and 53). Mr. Chase was
Plaintiff's representative at the Appeal Referee's Hearing (R. page 32).
Mr. Flint voluntarily quit because of chest pains which he attributed to harassment bylhe
Box Elder County Auditor (R. page 36). There were feelings over claimant's position and high
pay relative to the elected officials. The animosity stemmed from the election (R. pages39·41i
There was no question about claimant putting in full time or sufficient time to accomplish his
work (R. page 39). One of the reasons given for demanding more detailed time reportstrom\he

I

l

'

claimant was that such reports were necessary to make charges against other departments '
However, other department heads that did work in other departments were not requiredtokeei
the detailed time reports that the County Auditor was demanding from the claimant, Mr. Flin!
(R. pages 35 and 40).

2
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j

i

II

While the animosity over the time reports precipitated claimant's resignation, there were
other incidents that contributed. As an example, the County Auditor complained to the
Commission that claimant was wasting time and asked the sheriff to back up her complaints
when in fact claimant was discussing county business during the time complained of (R. pages
36, 37, and 41 ).
Claimant did not discuss quitting his job with his doctor prior to quitting (R. page 34).
However, his doctor was aware of pressures and stresses that the claimant had with respect to
his work and had monitored the situation for the past year. Had claimant consulted him with
respect to quitting his job the doctor would have advised claimant to quit. The doctor's letter
was new evidence to the Board of Review that had not been available to the Department
Representative or the Appeals Referee (R. page 19).

ARGUMENT
POINTI
THAT IN REVIEWING THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL
AFFIRM THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established.
Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the
jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board
01

Review are supported by evidence. they will not be disturbed, Martinez v. Board of Review, 25

U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). In analyzing the above referenced review provision, this Court
has stated:
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"Under Section 35-4-1 O(i) the role of this Court is to sustain the determination of the
Board of Review unless the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of the
Board was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law
the determination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion could be draw~
from the facts." Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729.

POINT II
SECTION 35-4-5(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS INTENDEDTO
DISQUALIFY FROM THE RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ONLY THOSt
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED BY REASON OF THEIR OWN FAULT.
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
35-4-5

An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishinga
waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause
if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter until the claimantha1
performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages forsucn
services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provideo.
that no claimant shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant leaves work under
circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity and gooc
conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall in cooperation with the employer consider fortne
purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent
to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor
market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant ii
contrary to equity and good conscience.

This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist
a worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part.

Kennecoll

Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262,372P.20

987 (1962); and that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment
compensation by adhering to the volitional test. Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. The
Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Mills v. Gronning, (Utah, 1978)581P

I

2d 1334.

I
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However. a claimant voluntarily leaving work with good cause is in fact unemployed
withOut fault. This Court explained the reason for the good cause exception in the following
terms:
"What is 'good cause' must reflect the underlying purpose of the Act to relieve against
the distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming paradox of allowing benefits
to an individual whose unemployment is of his own volition disappears when the
context of the words is viewed in that light. The legislature contemplated that when an
individual voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of circumstances which may
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him to do so, the termination of his
employment is involuntary for the purposes of the Act. In statutory contemplation he
can not then reasonably be judged as free to stay at the job ... " Denby v. Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 567 P. 2d 626, 630, quoting
Krauss v. Mr. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A. 2d 27, 286 (1953).
The Court further explained "good cause" was limited to those instances where the
unemployment was caused by external pressures so compelling a reasonably prudent person,
exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in quitting under similar
circumstances. Mills v. Gronning, SUPRA., Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, SUPRA.; Stevenson Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428,552 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974);
Wilton v. Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P 2d 1071 (1976).

In the instant case the claimant voluntarily quit his employment, but under circumstances
constituting good cause, as shall be more fully explained in Points Ill and IV hereof.

POINT Ill
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT
HEREIN HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK.
The initial determination of good cause for voluntarily leaving work is a mixed question of
law and fact to be made by the administrative agency; the claimant has the burden of showing
good cause; and he must indicate an effort to work out the problems unless he can demonstrate
that such efforts would be futile. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, SUPRA.
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Plaintiff's principle contention on appeal is that claimant created his own stress bi
absolutely refusing to perform a simple time keeping chore. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 6). Theclaiman:
contended, however, that he was being required by the County Auditor, his former political
rival, to complete more detailed time reports than required of other department heads;thattne
County Auditor complained unjustifiably to the County Commission that claimant waswastrn~
time on the job; and that such forms of harassment caused the claimant to have a recurrenceol
chest pains and angina.
The findings of the Board of Review in favor of the claimant are supported throughouttne
record. First, with respect to the question of time reporting, Plaintiff's representative, Mr.Don
Chase, who was also claimant's supervisor, testified that he discussed time keeping wiln
claimant; that claimant "was very cooperative in reaching an educated estimation of howmucn
of his time was spent in the ... " various departments; "then after some time-afterthiswasdone
was the time that these reports surfaced." (R. page 40).
" ... there are other department heads that do work ... in other departments that are
not required-and it was during this type of discussion that Mr. Flint decided that he
was being asked to do things that other department heads were not being required to
do and, at one time was told that other department heads were filing these reports-if
my memory is correct. And I looked into the detail as to whether these other
department heads were actually being required to file reports in that much detail and
they were not... It's true that some of our department heads do file a time card ... with
the Auditor's department showing ... their 80-hour time period and that's it. He did not
object to having a time card the same as the rest of them. It was the detailing the time
report-accounting for every minute of every day that the objection came over ... and
checking with other department heads, they were not required to account for where
they were and what they were doing for the 8-hour period in detail every day. That1s
the crux of what, at least what I felt, the problem was. And it was in the back and forth
of trying to handle the animosity that seemed to have grown clear back from ... astaras
the election ... " (R. pages 40 and 41).
Second, with respect to claimant's contention of other harassment by the County Auditor
Mr. Chase's testifimony was to the effect:
(a)
that there were feelings over claimant's salary which was higherthan any of
the elected officials except possibly the County Attorney's (R. page 39).
that he never questioned that claimant put in a 40-hour week; thatclai.~ant
(b)
was "very cooperative in putting in what time was necessary to get his job done; that
claimant put in more than a 40-hour week and was on call "365 days a year, 24 hours a
day ... he had to come when he was needed." (R. pages 39 and 40).
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The claimant, Mr. Flint, also testified that the County Auditor spied upon him, and sought
10 have

the County Sheriff back her up in a complaint against claimant to the commissioners

(A. pages 36 and 37). While Flint's testimony of what the sheriff said is hearsay and, therefore,

can't be accepted as proving the truth of what the Auditor said, nevertheless, the sheriff's telling
it to Flint, whether true or not, served to increase the stress and feelings of animosity Flint felt
toward his political opponent.
The claimant contended that the result of these difficulties with his former political rival
was that he began to experience chest pains.
When asked by the Referee whether he had pains at any particular times or following any
particular circumstances the claimant responded:
"Yes. It was always after one of these ... hassles. These problems that was
coming from down there, was the only thing that would bring them on ... and
nothing else has caused me the problems. I haven't had any since. And so,
myself, I know what was causing them and I corrected it." (R. pages 37 and 38).
The claimant further stated that although his supervisor, Mr. Chase, told him not to let it
bother him, " ... a lot of it you can and some of it, you can't. And I just got scared. I'm still here and
I may have been if I'd stayed there, but l ... it just wasn't worth it to me ... " (R. page 38).
Plaintiff's representative, Mr. Chase, acknowledged that the claimant had mentioned his
chest pains. He testified that claimant was responsible to him and there was no reason for
claimant to be concerned about the detailed reports the Auditor was demanding. "But they did
seem to bother him." (R. page41 ). Mr. Chase also testified that he and claimant had sought for
some period of time to work the problem out but acknowledged he had no control over the
County Auditor because she was also an elected official. " ... So, it's like having almost ten
bosses at times." (R. page 41 ).
Cl·
aimant recognized that the problems at work were not resolvable and concluded he must
quit because h s d
1

t
.
. .
.
oc or had advised him 1n regard to his coronary:
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" ' ... I can't tell you what you can and can't do ... As you work your way back to
health ... you're going to be able to tell what you can and can't do. If anything starts to
causing you shortness of breath, chest pains, discomfort, knock it off.'" (R. page37).

(Emphasis added.)

In the face of such testimony Defendants submit that the Board of Review had ample
grounds to find that the claimant was being required to make reports which were not required
of other department heads. Because of the treatment being accorded to him by the employer,
the claimant began experiencing angina. Under such circumstances it must be consideredthat
the claimant left work with good cause.

POINT IV

CLAIMANT DID PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND TIMELY MEDICAL EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE FOR TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT.

Plaintiff complains that " ... the only medical evidence appearing anywhere in the record is
the letter from Dr. Blanch, which obviously was submitted subsequent to the date of the
hearing on July 25th ... "

Section 35-4-10(d)(2). Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:

" ... Upon appeal the Board of Review may on the basis of the evidence previously
submitted in such case, or upon the basis of such additional evidence as it may direct
be taken, affirm, modify or reverse the findings, conclusions and decisions of the
Appeal Referee ... "

The above-referenced statute obviously grants authority to the Board to consider
additional evidence on appeal. Therefore, even though the letter from Dr. Blanch was
submitted subsequent to the date of the hearing before the Appeal Referee, the Board did not
exceed its statutory authority by considering the letter on appeal.
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Plaintiff also complains that:
" ... the claimant was seeing a doctor regularly; but, by his own testimony, did not once
report to the doctor that he was having any chest pains or that he was bothered by his
problems at work until well after he quit. In response to the Referee's question at the
hearing as to whether or not Mr. Flint had been advised by his physician to quit his job,
Mr. Flint replied: 'No, I didn't discuss this with my doctor; and I didn't really get into
this the day that I came in here to quit.' (R. page 34)."
Defendants were unable to find any cases where this Court has previously considered the
question of whether a claimant must be advised by his physician to quit his job. However, this
question was considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a frequently cited case,
Deiss v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 475 Pa. 547, 381 A. 2d 132 (1977).

In Deiss SUPRA., 1 ALR 4th at 801, the Court held:
"We believe that... the relevant consideration is the claimant's health at the time of
terminating employment. If a claimant realizes that either physically or emotionally
he is unable to continue working and he offers competent testimony that at time of
termination, adequate health reasons existed to justify termination, we can perceive
no reason to require claimant to prove that he was advised to quit his job.
"In the instant case, appellant was under a psychotherapist's care for over a year
before terminating his employment with Gordon. The psychotherapist testified that at
the time of termination, appellant would have suffered a nervous breakdown had he
continued his employment. This opinion was based on the results of over one year of
analysis prior to appellant's termination of employment."
In this case, as in Deiss, the claimant realized that he was unable to continue working and
offered competent evidence that at the time of termination, adequate health reasons existed to
justify termination. That evidence was a letter from his doctor of seven years which stated in
part:

"I. have been aware of pressures and stresses that the patient has had with respect to
his work for some time and have monitored this over the past year. Recently, these
stresses have increased and have been associated with an exacerbation of angina. It
is my feeling that this is an extension of his underlying medical problem of
documented coronary disease in the past. Had I been consulted with respect to this
cond1t1on, 1t would have been my advice that Mr. Flint remove himself from the
stressful situation which was precipitating his coronary disease. As I would have
anticipated, his pain has stopped since he has been relieved of this." (R. page 19)
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His doctor substantiates claimant's own testimony that the stress from his job was
exacerbating his health problem. He also 1 ndicates an awareness of those pressures ano
stresses the claimant was under and states he had been monitoring this over the past year lti:
clear, therefore, that the correct interpretation of claimant's answer to the question, "Didyoui
doctor advise you to quit your job?", where he answers, "No, I didn't discuss this with mi
doctor .. ," (R. page 34) is precisely what he said-he didn't discuss quitting his job with his
doctor. Plaintiff's assertion that claimant "did not once report to the doctor that he was havin~
chest pains or that he was bothered by his problems at work until well after he quit," is simpli
not supported by the record.

CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Volume 10, Utah-General Rules of Adjudication.
Para. 5507 K (2)(c) provides:

"A worker who has left employment because of illness or disability, has the burden of
establishing that the condition actually existed and that it was sufficient to cause him
to leave work when he did."
Defendants submit claimant met that burden.

SUMMARY
The Record does contain evidence to support the findings of the Board of Reviewthatthe
claimant quit work with good cause.
Claimant was doing his work to the full satisfaction of his immediate supervisor (A. pages
39-41 ). Nevertheless his political opponent to whom he lost an election was harassing hirnbi
making demands for reports that other department heads weren't required to make (A. pages .

i
40 and 41) and by seeking the cooperation of the sheriff in complaining against himtotne'
commission. Other harassment occurred weekly (R. page 41 ). He recognized he shouldn'lletit
bother him but it did (R. page 41 ). His supervisor also recognized that it was bothering him.bu!
was unable to stop it (R. page 41 ). His doctor had advised him because of a coronary, to cease
any activity that caused him chest pains, shortness of breath or discomfort (R. page
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Claimant realized that the harassment and problems at work were causing him the chest pains
his doctor had warned him about. He feared this would bring on another coronary and quit (R.
pages 37 and 38)
Plaintiff claims claimant created his own stress by refusing to submit to the demands of the
Auditor Defendant submits that the animosity claimant felt because of the harassment would
not have disappeared by submitting. All the old antagonisms would have arisen anew within
him with each submission of a detailed time report which the Plaintiff's own representative
acknowledged no one else was required to submit.

CONCLUSION
The evidence in support of the decision of the Board of Review is both competent and
substantial. The decisions allowing benefits to the claimant should, therefore, be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this _ _ _ _ day of January, 1981.

DAVID L. WILKINSON,
Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

K. Allan Zabel
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